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Abstract. Dependability is a non-functional property that should be
assessed early in the software lifecycle. Although several UML profiles
exist for quantitative annotations of non-functional properties, none of
them provides concrete capabilities for dependability analysis of UML
system models. In this paper, we propose a dependability analysis and
modeling profile. The objective is twofold: to reuse proposals from the
literature on deriving dependability models from UML annotated speci-
fications and to be compliant with the recently adopted MARTE profile,
which provides a framework for general quantitative analysis concepts
that can be specialized to a particular analysis domain. The profile def-
inition process was done in several steps. Firstly, an in depth analysis of
the literature has been carried out to collect the information requirements
for the profile. Secondly, a domain model for dependability analysis was
defined independently of UML. Thirdly, the domain model was mapped
to UML extensions by specializing MARTE.
1 Introduction
The dependability of a system, as defined in [1] is the ability to avoid failures that
are more frequent and more severe than acceptable. The dependability encom-
passes a set of non-functional properties, called attributes of dependability, such
as: a) availability, the readiness for correct service; b) reliability, the continuity of
correct service; c) safety, the absence of catastrophic consequences on the users
and environment; d) maintainability, the ability to undergo modifications and
repairs.
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Although there are several proposals in literature on extending Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML) models with dependability annotations, as reviewed in
Sect. 3 of this paper, each covers only a subset of dependability aspects. Com-
pared with the performance and schedulability analysis domains, which are sup-
ported by standard UML profiles such as Schedulability, Performance and Time
(SPT) [2] and MARTE [3], there is no similar standard profile for the depend-
ability analysis of UML-based models yet. Another Object Management Group
standard specifying UML extensions for a variety of non-functional properties,
the “Profile for Modeling Quality of Service and Fault Tolerance Characteristics
and Mechanisms” (QoS&FT) [4], provides a flexible but heavy-weight mecha-
nism to define properties such as performance, security or reliability by means
of specific QoS catalogs. The annotation mechanism is supported by a two-step
process, which implies catalog binding and either the creation of extra objects
just for annotation purposes, or the specification of long Object Constraint Lan-
guage (OCL) expressions.
The main objective of this paper is to propose a UML profile for quantitative
dependability analysis of software systems modeled with UML with particular
focus on the following facets of dependability: reliability, availability and safety.
One of the requirements for such a profile is to reuse the best practices reported
in literature, and to unify the terminology and concepts for different dependabil-
ity aspects under a common dependability domain model. Another requirement
is to be compliant with the recently adopted MARTE profile [3] in two ways: a)
by using the Non-Functional Properties (NFP) framework and its correspond-
ing Value Specification Language (VSL) for defining dependability-specific data
types necessary for the profile definition; and b) by specializing general concepts
from MARTE’s generic quantitative analysis model (i.e., GQAM sub-profile) for
the dependability analysis domain. This paper builds on the previous work [5],
where a first attempt to extending UML with dependability analysis capabilities
was proposed.
We have adopted a systematic approach for the definition of the dependabil-
ity profile according to the recommendations from Selic [6] (see also Lagarde
et al.[7]). Firstly we define a conceptual domain model for dependability analy-
sis and modeling, which covers different dependability aspects, and reuses and
unifies the concepts from previous work, and secondly we map the domain con-
cepts to elements of a UML profile. The new proposed stereotypes extend either
UML meta-classes or MARTE stereotypes, and the stereotype attribute defi-
nitions use dependability-specific types defined in VSL. Our work proposes a
unified DAM profile, but does not discuss the different model transformation
techniques for generating different dependability models (Markov chains, Fault
Tree, Petri Nets, etc.). The proposed profile provides all the information neces-
sary to produce such models, but the actual model transformations represents
future work.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 gives an overview of the approach
followed for the profile definition; Sect. 3 gives a brief survey of related work
from literature; Sect. 4 introduces the dependability analysis (DA) conceptual
model, composed of different packages that cover separate dependability aspects;
Sect. 5 presents the proposed dependability profile; Sect. 6 gives an example of
profile application and Sect. 7 presents the conclusions.
2 Approach Overview
This section presents the process followed to define the dependability analysis
profile, in order to ensure that we produced a technically correct quality UML
profile that covers the necessary concepts according to the best practices reported
in literature.
Literature Review. The existing standard UML profiles for the analysis of non
functional properties of software systems have been analyzed, in particular the
SPT [2], QoS&FT [4] and MARTE [3]. None of them provides a comprehensive
support for dependability analysis, especially from a quantitative point of view.
We investigated the literature on dependability main concepts and taxonomy
(e.g., Avizienis et al. [1], Leveson [8], Lyu [9, 10]) as well as on standard methods
used for the quantitative assessment of dependability (e.g., [11, 12]). We also
surveyed the works from the literature proposing dependability modeling and
analysis of UML system specifications (about twenty papers). The output of
this preliminary step is a checklist of information requirements that a UML
profile for dependability analysis should satisfy reported in detail in [13].
Definition of Dependability Analysis (DA) Conceptual Model. We defined a DA
conceptual model to represent the main dependability concepts from the lit-
erature. Its construction required several refinement steps to consider all the
surveyed works. The final domain model is described in Sect. 4.
Completeness Assessment of the DA Domain Model. We verified whether all
the concepts considered in the survey have been included. If a concept was not
considered, we either repeated the refinement step or provided a motivation for
its exclusion.
Definition of the Dependability Analysis Modeling (DAM) Profile. Using the DA
conceptual model we defined: a) the DAM extensions (stereotypes and tags),
and b) DAM library containing dependability specific types. The objective is
to introduce a small set of stereotypes that can be easily used by the software
analyst. The DAM library has been defined by importing the MARTE library
and consists of basic and complex DA types.
DAM Profile Assessment. We verified whether the information requirements
from [13] are satisfied. If a requirement was not met, we went back to the previous
step in order to refine it.
3 Related Works
The brief survey from this section focuses on existing work from literature that
provides support for the quantitative dependability analysis of UML-based de-
signs. (A more detailed survey can be found in [13]).
Pataricza [14] extends the General Resource Modeling package of the SPT
profile with the notion of faults and errors to support the analysis of the effect
of local faults to the system dependability. The work includes permanent and
transient faults in the resources and error propagation to estimate which fault
may lead to a failure. Explicit fault injection behavioral models are also proposed
to represent faults as special virtual clients.
Addouche et al. [15] define a profile for dependability analysis of real-time
systems compliant with the SPT resource modeling. The UML extensions are
used to derive probabilistic time automata for the verification of dependability
properties via temporal logic formulas. The static model of the system is enriched
with new stereotyped classes associated with resources (but has the disadvantage
that new classes are introduced in the system model for dependability analysis
purposes).
Bernardi et al. [16] propose a set of UML Class Diagrams structured in
packages for collecting dependability and real-time requirements and properties
of automated embedded systems with the use of COTS fault-tolerance (FT)
mechanisms. The approach provides support for a semi-automatic derivation of
dependability analysis models, such as Stochastic Petri Nets and temporal logic.
In [17] is proposed a method to assess the quality of service of FT distributed
systems by deriving performability models from UML+SPT models.
The most comprehensive approach so far for reliability and availability anal-
ysis of UML specifications has been proposed by Bondavalli et al. [18]. A profile
for annotating software dependability properties compliant with the taxonomy
and basic concepts from [1] is proposed. A model transformation process derives
Timed Petri Net models via an intermediate model from the annotated UML
models. The approach supports the specification of error propagation between
components, as well as independent and dependent failures. It is possible to dis-
criminate between normal and failure states and events. The main drawback of
this work is the introduction of unnecessary redundant information in the UML
model, as sometime the joint use of more than one stereotype is needed.
DalCin [19] proposes a UML profile for specifying dependability mechanisms,
aimed at supporting the quantitative evaluation of the FT strategy effective-
ness. However, the profile lacks support for modeling the interactions between
dependability mechanisms and system components. Pai and Dugan [20] present
a method to derive dynamic fault tree from UML system models. The method
supports the modeling and analysis of sequence error propagations that lead to
dependent failures, redundancies and reconfiguration activities.
The papers [21–23] address specifically the reliability analysis of UML-based
design. D’Ambrogio et al. [21] define a transformation of UML models into
fault tree models to predict the reliability of component-based software. Cortel-
lessa and Pompei [22] propose a UML annotation for the reliability analysis
of component-based systems, within the frameworks of the SPT and QoS&FT
profiles. The annotations defined in [22] are used by Grassi et al. [23] where
a model-driven transformation framework for the performance and reliability
analysis of component-based systems is proposed. The method uses an inter-
mediate model that acts as bridge between the annotated UML models and the
analysis-oriented models. In particular, discrete time Markov process models can
be derived for the computation of the service reliability.
Ju¨rjens et al. define a safety [24] and reliability [25] check list, based on UML
extension standard mechanisms, to support the identification of failure-prone
components in the software design.
The approaches [26–28] support the safety analysis of UML-based system
models. Pataricza et al. [26] use UML stereotypes to identify erroneous states
and error correcting transitions in state machine diagram, integrating the nor-
mal and the faulty behavior of a system component in a single state machine.
Goseva et al. [27] devise a methodology for the risk assessment of UML models
at architectural level; a Markovian model is constructed to estimate the scenario
risk factor from risk factors associated to software components and connectors.
Hassan et al. [28] introduce a methodology for the severity analysis of software
systems modeled with UML, which integrates different hazard analysis tech-
niques (Functional Failure Analysis - FFA, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- FMEA - and Fault Tree Analysis - FTA) to identify system level and com-
ponent/connector level hazards and to evaluate the cost of failure of system
execution scenarios, software components and connectors.
4 Dependability Analysis Conceptual Model
The DA conceptual model has been constructed considering the main depend-
ability concepts from the literature as well as standard methods used for the
dependability assessment. It is organized into a set of packages, as shown in
Fig. 1. The top-level package includes:
– The System Core model. It provides a description of the system to be ana-
lyzed, according to a component-based view of the system [1, 9]. The model
includes also additional concepts for the description of redundancy structures
that may characterize a fault tolerant system [10].
– The Threats model introduces the threats [1, 9, 8] that may affect the system
at different levels as well as the relationships between the threats.
– The Maintenance model introduces the repair/recovery actions that are un-
dertaken in case of repairable systems [1, 10].
Figures 2,3,4, and 5 show the Class Diagrams of the DA conceptual model; the
markups used for the classes will be explained in Sect. 5. The Core model (Fig. 2)
represents the context for carrying out dependability analysis. Actually, it is a
component-based description of the system to be analyzed that includes both
structural and behavioral views. From the structural point of view, the system
consists of a set of components that are bound together through connectors, i.e.,
logical/physical links, in order to interact. A component can be a sub-system
consisting of sub-components. The structure of the system is what enables it
to generate the behavior. The system delivers a set of high-level services, in
response to user service requests. Each high-level service is, then, the system
Maintenance
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Fig. 1. Top-level package (L0), System Core package (L1)
behavior as perceived by its users and it is carried out by the interaction of
system components, which provide and request basic services to each others. A
service is implemented by a sequence of steps that represent component states
and actions.
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Fig. 2. Core model
The Core model acts as a bridge between the DA concepts and the concepts
introduced in MARTE for general quantitative analysis. Indeed, several classes of
the Core model will be mapped to stereotypes that specialize the ones introduced
in the GQAM profile.
Observe that some classes of the DA conceptual model have attributes that
represent requirements, metrics, properties or input parameters used in depend-
ability analysis, according to the surveyed works from literature. A detailed
description of the meaning of the attributes and their types is given in [13].
A system may be characterized by redundancy structures. Software and hard-
ware redundancy are the typical means used to increase the FT of software
systems, e.g., by eliminating single points of failure. The System Redundancy
model (Fig. 3) represents FT components [10], e.g., used in [18] to specify the
role played by a component within a redundant structure. In particular, a redun-
dant structure may consist of several variants, i.e, modules with different design
that provide the same services, allocated over different spares, a controller, that
is responsible for the co-ordination of the variants, an adjudicator, that either
looks for a consensus of two or more outputs among the variants (“N-version soft-
ware” scheme) or applies an acceptance test to the variant outputs (“recovery
block” scheme).
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Note that it is out of scope of this work to provide a support for the modeling
of FT architectures and, besides, this issue has been tackled by the QoS&FT pro-
file [4]. Rather, the introduction of the System Redundancy model is motivated
by the objective of providing a specific support for the quantitative dependability
analysis of those FT systems characterized by redundant structures.
The Threats model (Fig. 4) includes the threats that may affect the system,
namely the faults, errors, failures [1, 9] and hazards [8]. We have introduced an
abstract concept of impairment, that can be specialized depending of the type
of analysis domain, i.e., failure for reliability/availability analysis and hazard
for safety. The model represents also the cause-effect relationships between the
threats and the relationships between the threats and the system core concepts.
Then, a fault is the original cause of errors and impairments, and affects system
components. A fault generator concept is added to represent a mechanism, used
for example in [17, 14], to inject faults in the system and to specify the max
number of concurrent faults.
Errors are related to steps (i.e., states or actions) of the basic services pro-
vided by the faulty components. When an error affects an external state of a
faulty component, that is the service interface of that component, then error
propagations may occur from the faulty component to the interacting ones, via
the corresponding connectors. Error propagations may be related to each others,
for example they occur according to a given order [20]: the error propagation rela-
tion indicates the sequence of error propagations. Errors may cause impairments
Threats
SystemCore::
Core::
Service
SystemCore::
Core::
Component
SystemCore::
Core::
Connector
SystemCore::
Core::
Step
 Fault 
 Error 
 Failure 
Error
Propagation
effect
effect
cause cause
1..*
1..*
*
*
cause effect
*
*
1..*
*
from
to *
*
1..*
Fault
Generator
occurrenceRate
latency
occurrenceProb 
occurrenceDist
persistency
duration
numberOfFaults
fault
probability 
ErrorPropagation
Relation
propagationExpr
2..*
latency
probability 
occurrenceRate
MTTF
MTBF 
occurrenceDist
domain
detectability
consistency
consequence
Error
Step
fault
error
erroProperroProp
{ordered}
*
error
*
*
*
impairment
cause
1..*
 Hazard 
origin
severity
likelihood
/level
latency
accidentLikelihood 
cost
guideword
accident
SystemCore::
SystemRedundancy::
RedundantStructurecommomMode
occurrenceProb
/risk
*
* *
Impairment
impairment
*
*
*
impairment*
*
*
Failure
Step
Hazard
Step
impairment*
effect
*
Fig. 4. Threats model
at different system level: 1) at service step level, then leading to failure/hazard
steps, when the service provided by the component becomes not correct, 2) at
component level, when the component is not able to provide any basic service,
3) at system level, when the impairment is perceived by the system users. Fi-
nally, multiple dependent impairments can affect a redundant structure, such as
when several redundant components fail in the same mode (i.e., common mode
failures [10]).
The Maintenance model (Fig. 5) concerns repairable systems and includes
concepts that are necessary to support the evaluation of system availability, that
is the maintenance actions undertaken to restore the system affected by threats.
According to [1, 10], we distinguish repairs of system components, that involve
the participation of external agents (e.g., repairman, test equipment, etc) and re-
covery strategies, usually implemented in FT systems, that aim at transforming
the system anomalous states into correct states. In particular, the reconfigura-
tion steps imply the use of spare components [20]. The model represents the
replacement steps, in which faulty components are replaced by spares, and the
reallocation steps, in which software components are reallocated onto spares.
5 Dependability Analysis Modeling Profile
The process of mapping the conceptual model elements to profile elements has
been an iterative process, in which each class has been examined, together with
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its attributes, associations and constraints, to identify the most suitable UML
base concepts for it. Such activity has been carried out by following the gen-
eral guidelines in [6] and by specializing the UML extensions of the MARTE
profile [3].
Figure 6(a) shows an overview of the DAM profile. It consists of an UML
extension package, including the set of dependability stereotypes and attributes,
and of a model library, in which basic and complex dependability types as-
sociated to the attributes are defined. Most of the dependability stereotypes
specialize the ones of the GQAM sub-profile of MARTE.
<<profile>>
DAM
DAM_UML_Extensions
<<modelLibrary>>
DAM_Library
<<import>>
<<import>>
<<modelLibrary>>
DAM::DAM_Library
Complex_DA_Types
Basic_DA_Types
<<import>>
<<modelLibrary>>
MARTE::MARTE_Library::
BasicNFP_Types
<<profile>>
MARTE::NFPs
<<import>>
<<apply>>
(a) (b)
<<profile>>
MARTE::VSL::DataType
<<apply>>
<<profile>>
MARTE::GQAM
Fig. 6. (a) DAM profile and (b) DAM library
A low level view of the DAM Library is shown in Fig. 6(b). Complex de-
pendability types are MARTE data-types which combine different basic NFP
types, from MARTE library, and/or basic dependability types. On the other
hand, basic dependability types can be either simple enumeration types (such
as CriticalLevel used to specify a failure consequence or an hazard severity) or,
in turn, specialization of basic NFP common types. An example, of the latter
is the DaFrequency, which is a basic NFP real type, introduced to specify, e.g.,
a failure occurrence rate as a real value together with a failure frequency unit
(e.g., 0.1−2 failures per hour). We have also applied the MARTE NFPs profile
to define new dependability types, e.g., DaFrequencyUnitKind which is an enu-
meration type including a set of frequency units of fault/failure occurrence rates
and of repair/recovery rates (see Fig. 7(c)).
The specialization of the concept of basic NFP common type allowed us to
reuse several properties of the super-type that enrich the annotation capabilities
at system model level, such as the expression property, that supports the speci-
fication of expressions using the VSL syntax, and the source property that can
be used to define the origin of the specification (e.g., a requirement, a metric or
an input parameter).
In the DAM profile definition, we have applied several suggestions and pat-
terns proposed in [7] that enable the creation of a profile from the conceptual
model which is consistent with the UML meta-model. Moreover, we adopted
the best practise of MARTE to keep track of the mapping between the concep-
tual model and the DAM profile. In particular, the name of each DAM extension
(stereotype, complex/basic dependability type) is the name of the corresponding
conceptual model element prefixed by Da, namely Dependability Analysis.
Domain classes are good candidates to become stereotypes but, eventually,
only a subset of them have been mapped to a stereotype (i.e., the dotted classes in
Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5). Indeed, as in [7], we aimed at providing a small set of stereo-
types that will be actually going to be used in practical modeling situations.
Then, abstract classes, e.g., FT Component (Fig. 3), have not been considered
in the mapping process. Nevertheless, if an abstract class carries information
and it is specialized with concrete classes, such information has been considered
in the mapping of the latter as well as of the concrete classes associated with the
abstract class. This is the case, for example, of the abstract class Impairment,
where its attributes have been mapped to attributes of the complex dependabil-
ity types DaFailure and DaHazard. Moreover, the association-ends impairment
have been renamed and mapped to attributes of the stereotypes DaComponent,
DaService corresponding to concrete classes associated with the abstract class
(compare Figs. 4 and 7(a,b)). On the other hand, the classes modeling threats
and maintenance actions (i.e., classes with diagonal stripes in Figs. 4 and 5)
have been defined to characterize complex dependability concepts through their
attributes. Then, such classes have been mapped to complex dependability types
of the DAM library (Fig. 7(b)).
Each stereotype extends either a set of UML meta-classes or MARTE stereo-
type. To define extension associations for a given stereotype, we have applied
<<stereotype>>
DaComponent
stateful: Boolean[0..1]
origin: Origin[0..1]
.....
complexity: NFP_Real[*]
fault: DaFault [*]
error:DaError [*]
failure: DaFailure [*]
hazard: DaHazard [*]
repair: DaRepair [*]
<<stereotype>>
MARTE::GRM::Resource
isActive: Boolean[0..1]
<<stereotype>>
DaService
execProb: NFP_Real[*]
.....
failure: DaFailure [*]
hazard: DaHazard [*]
recovery: DaRecovery [*]
<<stereotype>>
MARTE::GQAM::GaScenario
CriticalLevel
minor
marginal
major
catastrophic
<<enumeration>>
MARTE_Library::BasicNFP_Types::
NFP_Real
MARTE_Library::BasicNFP_Types::
NFP_CommonType
<<dataType>> <<nfpType>> DaCriticalLevel
value: CriticalLevel
{valueAttr=value}
<<dataType>> <<nfpType>> DaFrequency
<<dataType>> <<nfpType>>
unit: DaFrequencyUnitKind
precision:Real
{unitAttr=unit}
<<dataType>> <<nfpType>>
(a) (b)
(c)
<<tupleType>>
DaHazard
occurrenceProb: NFP_Real[*]
risk: NFP_Real[*]
origin: FactorOrigin[0..1]
severity: DaCriticalityLevel[*]
likelihood: DaLikelihood[*]
level: NFP_Real[*]
latency: NFP_Duration[*]
accidentLikelihood: DaLikelihood[*]
cost: DaCurrency[*]
guideword: Guideword[*]
accident: String[*]
<<tupleType>>
DaFault
occurrenceRate: DaFrequency[*]
latency: NFP_Duration[*]
occurrenceProb: NFP_Real[*]
.....
DaFrequencyUnitKind
<<unit>> ft/s
<<unit>> ft/ms {baseUnit=ft/s,convFactor=1E-3}
...
<<unit>> fail/s
<<unit>> fail/hr {baseUnit=ft/min,convFactor=1/60}
...
<<unit>> repair/s
....
<<unit>> rec/s
....
<<enumeration>>
Fig. 7. (a) stereotypes, (b) complex dependability types, (c) basic dependability types.
the general guidelines in [6], based on similarity of the semantics of the UML
meta-classes and of the stereotype. To facilitate the extension process we have
exploited the proposals in the surveyed literature, to identify the UML model
elements annotated with the same dependability properties as the ones charac-
terizing the stereotype. Finally, if a semantically equivalent stereotype exists in
MARTE, then we have defined the dependability stereotype as a sub-stereotype
of the former.
Attributes of a conceptual class have been mapped to attributes of the cor-
responding UML extension (stereotype/complex dependability type). This map-
ping activity implied the definition of a basic dependability type for each at-
tribute as well as the definition of its multiplicity. The mapping of associations
has been less trivial than that of attributes. We have often applied the reference
association pattern of Lagarde et al.[7]. An exemplification of such pattern is
given in Fig. 4, where the Component class is characterized by an association
with the Fault class supported by the association-end fault. The latter is used
to define the attribute fault of DaComponent, of complex dependability type
DaFault (Fig. 7(a)). Observe that association multiplicities have been mapped
to attribute value multiplicities.
It is worth to note that the conceptual model is characterized by several
constraints written in OCL. Such constraints have been assigned to the DAM
extensions and represent constraints for the use of the profile at model specifi-
cation level. An excerpt of the DAM profile is depicted in Fig. 7: due to space
limitation, not all the attributes are shown. The whole set of DAM extensions
can be found in [13].
6 Usage of the DAM Profile
The purpose of this section is to illustrate, through an example, the usage of
the DAM profile, as well as to demonstrate how an established methodology [27]
for dependability analysis benefits from the DAM profile. The methodology for
risk assessment proposed by Goseva et al. [27] introduces the safety related
parameters in a tabular form, i.e., no UML extensions are provided. This section
shows how these parameters can be added to a UML diagram using the DAM
profile, while the methodology steps proposed in [27] (which cannot be presented
here in detail due to space limitations) can still be applied.
Figure 8 depicts the use case diagram of the pacemaker example used in [27]
to illustrate the methodology. Each use case (UC) is later realized as a (set of)
UML sequence diagram(s) representing system scenario(s). We have attached to
the UCs, using the DAM profile, the original annotations that were given by the
authors in the tabular form. Note that the UCs are stereotyped as DaServices.
So, the corresponding attributes can properly describe their dependability prop-
erties. As an example, see the annotation in the AVI UC, where its execution
probability execProb, i.e., a software requirement describing an input depend-
ability model parameter (source=assm), is gathered in the UML model. Also,
it can be observed how the dependability metrics to be computed in the model
(i.e., the hazard risk factors) are considered as predicted values (source=pred).
Using the VSL syntax, variable names are preceded by the $ symbol, as the
$R AVI variable.
AVI AAI AATVVI VVT
Programming
PatientsHeart DoctorsProgrammer
In this example, it is assumed that 
each scenario is represented by 
only one UML sequence diagram.
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.29,source=assm), hazard=(risk=(value=$R_AVI, source=pred))}
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.15,source=assm), hazard=(risk=(value=$R_AAT, source=pred))}
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.15,source=assm),
  hazard=(risk=(value=$R_VVT, source=pred))}
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.01,source=assm),hazard=(risk=(value=$R_Pro, source=pred))}
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.20,source=assm), hazard=(risk=(value=$R_VVI, source=pred))}
<<DaService>>
{execProb=(value=0.20,source=assm), hazard=(risk=(value=$R_AAI, source=pred))}
Fig. 8. Use case diagram of the pacemaker.
Figure 9 shows the components and connectors that make up the pacemaker
architecture4. In [27], the dependability input parameters complexity and cou-
pling are calculated from the software functional requirements. Indeed, the cou-
pling of a connector is derived from the UML SD, while the complexity of a
4 To avoid cluttering, only one component and one connector have been annotated.
component is obtained from its associated state-chart. On the other hand, the
characterization of the hazards (severity, guideword, accident) affecting a com-
ponent/connector is the result of the FMEA technique, carried out by a domain
expert.
Magnet
Programming
Heart
ATRIAL MODEL
<<component>>
VENTRICULAR
<<component>>
COMM.GNOME
<<component>>
REED SWITCH
<<component>>
COIL DRIVER
<<component>>
<<DaConnector>>
{coupling = (value=0.00039, source=assm);
 errorProp = (from=COMM.GNOME,to=VENTRICULAR);
 hazard = (
      severity = (value=marginal,source=assm),
      guideword = "incorrect command",
      accident = "incorrect operation mode and pacing rate"),
      risk = (value=$R_CG-VT, source=pred)}
                
<<DaComponent>>
{complexity = (value=0.3, source=assm);
 origin=sw;
 hazard = (
      severity = (value=marginal,source=assm),
      guideword = "misinterpreted bytes",
      accident = "heart triggered but device monitored"),
      risk = (value=$R_CG, source=pred)}               
Heart
Fig. 9. The architecture of the pacemaker.
For each scenario, the dependability metrics (risk factors) are estimated as
a product of the complexity (coupling) of the component (connector) and the
hazard severity (the authors map the marginal severities to 0.5). The methodol-
ogy ranks the critical components/connectors using such information. Moreover,
considering these component (connector) risk factors together with a “control
flow graph” obtained from the functional software requirements, the methodol-
ogy is enabled to construct a Markov model for each scenario, where the scenario
risk factor can be computed. Finally, the scenario risk factors are used to get
the UCs risk factors as well as the overall system risk factor.
In conclusion, we observe that the DAM profile covers all the safety input
parameters and metrics proposed in [27]. Since the DAM profile is compliant with
the UML standard, it is possible now to enter all the annotations required for
the Goseva methodology by using any standard UML tool. The only additional
effort is the implementation of the model transformation which will take as input
UML models with DAM annotations and produce as output the Markov chain
model, following the approach proposed in [27].
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a profile to support dependability modeling and
analysis of UML designs. The proposed profile is compliant with the standard
MARTE profile, and has been built considering current dependability standards.
We have defined the profile by following the approach proposed by Selic [6] and
applying the patterns from Lagarde [7]. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to provide a common conceptual UML model for different de-
pendability communities. We consider the profile as an open proposal, subject
to future refinements and extensions to address particular issues in the different
dependability domains (e.g., FT systems). Several reasons let us envision a great
potential for our proposal. First, the existing UML-based approaches for analyz-
ing dependability aspects of software systems surveyed in Sect. 3, can get direct
benefit from the profile. Indeed, our proposal offers a common modeling support
intended to covers all the information required by the existing methodologies.
As an example, we have illustrated how one of these proposals [27] can take
advantage of the profile. Future work includes the implementation of the model
transformations that take as input UML+DAMmodels and produce different de-
pendability models, by following the same approach as in the existing proposals.
On the other hand, the works that focus exclusively on modeling dependability
as opposed to analyzing it, can also be benefit from the profile by using its anno-
tations or even by extending it. Among such works, there are methodologies for
collecting dependability requirements, e.g. safety domain requirements in [29];
others target certification according to standard software requirements [30]; and
finally, there are traditional works in dependability analysis of software systems
outside the UML umbrella. In the last case, the challenge is not how to integrate
the DAM profile, but rather how to integrate the UML within the respective
methodology.
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